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I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of equitable distribution, upon which the domestic
relations law of nearly all jurisdictions is based, had its ideological
beginnings in the divorce reform movement of the 1960s. 1 Although

1. Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of
Property to Address Need, 56 FoRIAM L. R v. 827, 833 (1988); see generally 24 Am. JuR. 2D Divorce
and Separation § 870 (1983) (hereinafter 24 Am. Jut.

2D).
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the early reformers' efforts focused largely on the elimination of
fault in divorce actions, another important goal of the movement
was to make the laws regarding property distribution gender-neu2
tral.
The new doctrine appeared to address both of these concerns by
requiring that marital assets be divided in an equitable manner upon
divorce regardless of title ownership, possession, or fault.' Based on
the theory that marriage is a voluntary partnership with each partner
contributing equally to the marital estate, the doctrine of equitable
distribution proceeds on the presumption that each partner is thus
entitled to an equitable share of the estate upon divorce in order
to avoid the unjust enrichment of the spouse with title to or possession of the property. 4
Another of the predominant goals underlying the doctrine of
equitable distribution is that of the final separation of the parties
that once each spouse receives his or her equitable share of the
marital assets, he or she will then be financially self-sufficient and
free to form other lasting relationships. 5 This goal of final separation
contravenes the traditional common-law approach to spousal maintenance in which a husband was obligated, through the imposition
of alimony, to support his wife even after they divorced, although
6
the support alimony would be terminated if the wife remarried.
This traditional approach was founded on the notion that the
man is predominantly responsible for the financial well-being of his
family - with the concomitant inference that the woman is dependent upon the man for economic support even after he is no
longer her husband, until the time she finds another man to support
her. 7 With the advent of equitable distribution statutes, however,

2. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 833 n.30.
3. See 24 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 1, § 870.
4. Id.
5. See Reynolds, supra note I, at 835.
6. Deborah A. Batts, Remedy Refocus: In Search of Equity in "EnhancedSpouse/Other Spouse"
Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 751, 754 (1988).
7. See Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279, 288 (1989).
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the traditional status-based approach to property allocation by the
long-term "sharing" of assets under alimony provisions was supplanted by the modern equality-based idea of marriage as a partnership, the assets of which could be easily, cleanly, and equitably
partitioned between the parties upon divorce. 8
In 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognized
marriage as a partnership or shared enterprise: "[tihe law which
once saw marriage as a sacrament now conceptualizes it as roughly
analogous to a business partnership." 9 Three years later, the court
adopted a constructive trust approach to the distribution of assets
upon divorce in order to secure for the spouse seeking relief an
interest in property toward which he or she had made material economic contributions during marriage. 10 At the heart of the court's
holding was the policy of preventing the unjust enrichment of the
spouse with title to the property: "[a] wife should be entitled to a
trust in property to the extent that the husband is unjustly enriched
by her contribution."' However, the court noted that a constructive
trust should not be imposed in situations in which a spouse has
made mere noneconomic contributions to the marriage, such as the
traditional domestic services of wife, mother, and housekeeper.' 2
Two years later, in the 1983 case of LaRue v. LaRue, the court
adopted the doctrine of equitable distribution, holding that any division of marital property upon divorce is to be centered around
the equitable concept that each marital partner should receive the
benefit of his or her economic or noneconomic contributions toward
the accumulated assets of the marriage. 3 Thus, the LaRue court
extended its protection against unjust enrichment to wives, mothers,
and housekeepers by recognizing that contributions of domestic serv-

8. Id.
9. Dyer v. Tsapis, 249 S.E.2d 509, 511 (W. Va. 1978).
10. Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709 (f. Va. 1981), partially overruled by LaRue v.
LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983).
11. Patterson, at 716.
12. Id. at 712.
13. LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983).
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ices are as worthy of consideration in the distribution of the marital
14
estate as are economic contributions.
As a result of the LaRue decision, the West Virginia Legislature
in 1984 passed a comprehensive bill which not only codified the
court's holding but also sought to establish precise parameters for
the equitable distribution of property in West Virginia. 5 Section 482-32 of the West Virginia Code explicitly establishes the presumption

that all marital property shall be divided equally between both
spouses, subject to certain discretionary factors.1 6 Furthermore, since
only marital property is subject to equitable distribution under section 48-2-32, the statutory distinction between marital property 7 and
separate property 8 is carefully delineated.

It was inevitable, however, that ambiguities would remain when
these definitions were applied to the various circumstances involved
in specific cases brought before the court. Questions concerning how
14. See id. at 322.
15. 1984 W. Va. Acts 391; (codified as amended in scattered sections of W. VA. CODE § 482-1; see generally Penelope Crandall, Critique of West Virginia's New Equitable DistributionStatute,
87 W. VA. L. REv. 87 (1984). The court, in Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449, 453 (W. Va. 1987),
notes that further changes made in West Virginia's equitable distribution statutes in 1986 are simply
clarifications in the law as it existed under the 1984 provisions and LaRue.
16. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32 (1986) provides, in pertinent part: "(c) In the absence of a valid
agreement, the court shall presume that all marital property is to be divided equally between the
parties ...." See infra note 53 for further discussion of § 48-2-32.
17. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e) (1986) provides, in pertinent part:
"Marital property" means:
(1) All property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage ... except
that marital property shall not include separate property as defined in subsection (f) of this
section; and
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties
to a marriage, which increase results from (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital
property . . ., or (B) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.
18. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f) (1986) provides, in pertinent part:
"Separate property" means:
(1) Property acquired by a person before marriage; or
(2) Property acquired by a person during marriage in exchange for separate property
which was acquired before the marriage; or
(4) Property acquired by a party during the marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent
or distribution; or
(6) Any increase in the value of separate property ... which is due to inflation or
to a change in market value resulting from conditions outside the control of the parties.
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to classify and distribute property which has, through time, use, or
circumstance, lost those characteristics which would clearly indicate
its "marital" or "separate" identity were certain to arise.
The purpose of this Note, therefore, is to examine, from a historical perspective, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
interpretation of the definitions of marital and separate property
under the equitable distribution statutes - specifically, those interpretations with respect to gifts between spouses and gifts to the
marital estate. Such an examination will demonstrate how the court
has progressively broadened the scope of marital property in an
attempt to fashion more equitable remedies to the always-difficult
problem of the distribution of assets upon the dissolution of a marriage. Even so, the court has remained quite conservative in its consideration of long-term equity between divorcing spouses, and thus
many other avenues remain to be explored by the court before truly
equitable solutions to this problem can be realized.
This Note will begin with a survey of the court's difficulties in
reaching an equitable result in the distribution of interspousal gifts.
The next section contains an examination of the court's holding
regarding the distribution of separate property that has been jointly
titled subsequent to the marriage, as well as an examination of the
underlying theory upon which the court's holding is based. The fourth
section demonstrates how the court has recently expanded its definition of marital property with regard to not only jointly titled
assets, but also assets that have been retained by one spouse in a
separately-held business venture - again with an examination of the
theory underlying the court's decision. The fifth and sixth sections
will critique both the specific holdings discussed in the previous sections as well as the prevailing general application of equitable distribution statutes. In the final section, a more liberal approach to
equitable distribution will be advanced for the court's consideration.

A.

II. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERSPOUSAL GIFTS
LaRue v. LaRue: Presumption of Gift

The history of how the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
has considered the equitable distribution of property transferred from
one spouse to the other is troubled. The court's first articulation
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concerning how West Virginia trial courts should characterize and
equitably distribute interspousal gifts came in LaRue v. LaRue. 19
In the divorce action giving rise to the LaRue case, the trial court
awarded Mrs. LaRue only alimony and an allowance for health insurance, although she had performed capably as a wife, mother,
and homemaker throughout the LaRues' thirty-year marriage. 20 On
the other hand, Mr. LaRue was permitted to retain the entire interest
in both the marital home2 ' and the couple's jointly held bank accounts, whose funds he had withdrawn shortly before the divorce
action was filed.Y
In reversing the trial court's decision and ordering the equitable
distribution of the couple's marital assets, the LaRue court held, in
part, that in calculating the amount of equitable distribution due
from one spouse to the other, the trial court may consider the value
of any gifts given to one spouse by the other spouse during the
marriage.2 However, the court made clear, this holding should not
be construed as weakening the presumption of a gift between husband and wife, and the burden of rebutting this presumption remains
with the spouse claiming that there was no intention that a gift of
the property be conferred upon his or her spouse.7 Simply put, in
the context of the LaRue case, the trial court may consider the
marital home and the joint bank accounts as "gifts" in arriving at
the amount of the equitable distribution award ultimately due Mrs.
LaRue if Mr. LaRue is unable to rebut the presumption that he
intended these properties as gifts to his ex-wife.
The stated purpose of this holding is to provide for the situation
in which a spouse retains his or her interest in jointly held property
19. LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983).
20. Id. at 315.
'21. Id.
22. Id. at 315, 326. While unclear from the court's opinion, it appears that Mr. LaRue also
retained the bulk of the couple's personal property. See id. at 315.
23. Id. at 321, 323, 326.
24. Id. at 321 n.14, 326. See also W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1931), amended by 1984 W. Va.
Acts 391:
Where one spouse purchases real or personal property and pays for same, but takes

title in the name of the other spouse, such transaction shall, in the absence of evidence of
a contrary intention, be presumed to be a gift by the spouse so purchasing to the spouse
in whose name the title is taken.
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when the presumption of gift has not been rebutted, while this spouse
is also entitled to some equitable distribution. 25 Yet while the court's
holding on this issue may sound both simple in method and laudable
in motive, it proved to be rather confusing in application when the
court attempted to explain how the equitable distribution of gifts
would operate in the division of the LaRues' joint bank accounts.
Noting that a rebuttable presumption of a gift in the creation
of a joint bank account had previously been recognized by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,26 the court explained that if,
on the one hand, Mr. LaRue is not able upon remand to rebut the
presumption of gift arising from the creation of the joint bank accounts, then Mrs. LaRue will be entitled to one-half of their value
which could be offset as a "gift credit" in Mrs. LaRue's ultimate
equitable distribution award. 27 If, on the other hand, the presumption of a gift of one-half the value of the joint bank accounts is
rebutted by Mr. LaRue, or if Mrs. LaRue can show that some portion of the joint bank accounts came from her economic contribution, Mr. LaRue's retention of the bank accounts will provide no
offset against the amount of equitable distribution found to be due
- that is, he will not be entitled to a "gift credit" deduction on
28
the ultimate equitable distribution award.
However, as the opinion is written, it is unclear whether Mr.
LaRue's retention of the bank accounts, by rebutting the presumption of a gift, will shield this money from Mrs. LaRue in the ultimate
equitable distribution award found due - that is, in the parlance
of West Virginia's post-LaRue equitable distribution statute, will the
bank accounts be considered Mr. LaRue's separate property and
thus not be subject to equitable distribution? Although this would
appear to be the intended result of the court's holding, it is not
difficult to foresee inequitable results arising from this, especially
if the value of the joint bank accounts is substantial and the spouse

25. LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 326 (W. Va. 1983).
26. See id. See also Simmons v. Simmons, 298 S.E.2d 144, 147 (W. Va. 1982) ("[o]nce funds
[W]ithdrawal
are deposited in a joint banking account, they are presumed to be jointly owned ....
of the funds by the donor depositor does not conclusively rebut the presumption [of gift] .. .
27. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 326.
28. Id. at 326 n.22.
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rebutting the presumption of gift was in a position to control the
acquisition and disposition of the funds in the accounts.
Thus, in trying to predict how jointly held property would be
equitably distributed under the obtuse language of the LaRue holding, it appears that the spouse entitled to equitable distribution of
jointly held property may be allowed to take a presumptive onehalf of the property in dispute irrespective of the property's characterization by the court as either a gift or not a gift. That is, if
it is found that the creation of the joint bank accounts was intended
to confer a gift of one-half of the amount deposited therein upon
Mrs. LaRue, then she will take the property as a gift, and the court
may allow Mr. LaRue to credit this amount against the ultimate
equitable distribution award owed to Mrs. LaRue. 29 If, however, it
is found that the creation of the joint bank accounts was not intended to confer a gift of one-half of the funds deposited therein
upon Mrs. LaRue, but that for equitable reasons, the funds should
not be characterized as solely the property of Mr. LaRue - or if
it is found that Mrs. LaRue contributed to the accounts - then the
court may require the accounts to be valued as part of the LaRues'
net assets now subject to equitable distribution.30 In this manner,
Mrs. LaRue may still be entitled to a presumptive one-half of their
value under the newly-recognized doctrine of equitable distribution.3
Either way, under the LaRue holding, Mr. LaRue may be required
to restore to his wife one-half of the money in their jointly owned
bank accounts.
B.

Hamstead v. Hamstead: An Inequitable Solution Under the
Statute

The court did not have the opportunity to further apply and
clarify its holding on this issue, however, because soon after the
LaRue decision, equitable distribution was statutorily established in part, at least, to clear up some of the confusion resulting from

29. Id. at 326.
30. Id. at 326 n.22.

31. See id. This is predicated on the presumption that all of the funds in the account were
neither acquired by the parties prior to the marriage nor obtained during the marriage by way of
inheritance or gifts from third parties. Id. at 321.
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the court's previous decisions.3 2 Unfortunately, on this issue, the
confusion only became worse.
In the 1987 case of Hamstead v. Hamstead, the court re-examined its LaRue holding regarding the classification of interspousal
gifts. 33 In Hamstead, the appellant, Mrs. Hamstead, assigned as error the trial court's ruling that certain items of personal property
- jewelry, fur coats, an automobile, and furniture bought by her
from proceeds of stock given to her by Mr. Hamstead during their
marriage - as well as jointly owned real estate were to be considered
marital property for purposes of equitable distribution. 34 Instead,
Mrs. Hamstead argued, since her husband had conveyed these items
to her as gifts during the course of their marriage, these gifts should
not fall within the definition of marital property, but should instead
be considered as separate property, not subject to equitable distribution under the statute.35
The court did not agree with Mrs. Hamstead, however. Instead,
the court based its holding on section 48-2-1(e)(1), which states that
all property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage, except property specifically excluded by section 48-2-1(f), are
to be considered as marital property for purposes of equitable dis36
tribution at the time of divorce.
Yet while section 48-2-1(0(4) specifically states that "[p]roperty
acquired by a party during marriage by gift . .. '37 is to be considered as "separate property," the court apparently chose not to
rely on this provision in reaching its decision. Instead, the court

32. See also Crandall, supra note 15, at 87.
33. Hamstead v. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va.), overruled, Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d
794 (W. Va. 1987). Note that in Hamstead, the court also held that W. VA. CODE § 48-2-33(a) (1986)
requires full disclosure of one spouse's financial assets to the other spouse at the time of divorce,
and contemplates a meaningful hearing on the subject of equitable distribution of property at which
the spouse submitting financial data may be cross-examined concerning the source and amounts of
assets. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 218. This holding has not been overturned. See Lambert v. Lambert,
376 S.E.2d 331, 332 (W. Va. 1988).
34. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 218-19.
35. Id. at 219; see also § 48-2-1(f)(4) (1986) (defining "separate property" as "[p]roperty ac-

quired by a party during marriage by gift, bequest, devise, descent or distribution.").
36. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 219; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (1986).
37. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f)(4) (1986).
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cited language used in a case pre-dating both the LaRue decision
and the statutory adoption of equitable distribution:
Transfers between related persons can be challenged not only by the persons
involved, but by third-parties as well. The presumption concerning gift has its
most forceful effect when a transfer is challenged by a third-party, particularly
after the death of one of the related persons. The court cannot be blind to the
obvious fact that most married persons do not contemplate divorce throughout
the entire course of a marriage, and that transfers of property between spouses
isusually intendedfor the joint benefit of both. While we must retain the presumption of gift in order to avoid difficult third-party claims (since spouses usually
do intend to confer the benefit of property on their other spouse in the event of
their death), the presumption of gift is probably best rebutted in a suit between
spouses by a clear showing of unjust enrichment. Most people do not intend
unjustly to enrich the other man.3 1

Thus, the Hamstead court makes clear that although the transfers
of property as "gift" made by Mr. Hamstead to his wife during
the marriage might survive claims by third-parties, the presumption
of gift in interspousal transfers of property during marriage as stated
in LaRue has no effect in excluding the transferred property from
the marital pool of assets to be equitably distributed under the statute: "[tihe fact that the assets have been acquired by one spouse
and 'given' to the other does not alter the inclusion of these assets
in the 'marital property' pool."139
Yet while the court's holding in Hamstead may seem to run
counter to its LaRue decision regarding interspousal transfers of
property and their classification as "gift," the effect of the holdings
is actually similar. For example, in LaRue, as noted above, if the
presumption of gift is not rebutted, then the donee spouse can take
one-half of the jointly held property, and the donor spouse is awarded
38. Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 716 (%V.Va. 19'81) (emphasis added), partially
overruled by LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W. Va. 1983); see also LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 335
(W. Va. 1983) (Neely, J., concurring):
[The] presumption [that any transfer of property between married persons is a gift] ...
confounds all human experience; it is far more reasonable to presume that the titling of
marital property in the name of one spouse is an expedience, and that mutual benefit is
intended ....It follows, then, that upon the termination of a marriage the circumstances
that justified titular ownership in the name of one spouse ceases to exist, and the implicit
expectations upon which the transfer was made are editirely confounded.
39. Hamstead v. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d 216, 219 (NV. Va.), partially overruled by Roig v. Roig
364 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1987).
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this amount as a "gift credit" to be applied to the ultimate equitable
distribution award.4 In Hamstead, though there may in fact be a
"gift" of the property to the donee spouse, by not excluding the
"gift" from the marital pool of assets to be ultimately distributed,
the donor spouse again is awarded a "gift credit" equal to one-half
of the value of the "gift" property which has been, in effect, given
back to the donor spouse by the Hamstead court.4 1 However, this
result was neither equitable nor fair, and the West Virginia Supreme
42
Court of Appeals subsequently realized its error.
C.

Roig v. Roig: The Correct Application of the Statute

Nine months later, in Roig v. Roig, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals reversed its Hamstead holding. 43 In Roig, the appellant, Mrs. Roig, asserted that the trial court erred in including
in the marital estate the value of $15,000 of jewelry and furs that
she alleged were gifts to. her from her ex-husband and her ex-husband's aunt, citing section 48-2-1(0(4), which defines separate property as "[p]roperty acquired by a person during marriage by gift,

bequest, devise, descent or distribution.""

40. See LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 326.
41. See Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 219. In effect, Mr. LaRue and Mrs. Hamstead are arguing
the same point: any transfers of property from one spouse to the other are intended as gifts and
must be treated as such. However, they are not in agreement regarding who should retain the property
upon divorce. Mr. LaRue obviously wants to retain it, thus not allowing his ex-wife to profit from
his former largesse. See LaRue, 304 S.E.2d at 335 (Neely, J., concurring). Mrs. Hamstead argues
that the court should not give protection to the donor spouse by lawfully divesting the donee spouse
of a valid inter vivos gift, and thus she should be allowed to retain property given her by her exhusband during the marriage. See Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 219.
42. Note, however, that in McComas v. McComas, 358 S.E.2d 217, 221 (W. Va. 1987) - a
case which post-dates Hamstead - the court once again applied the presumption-of-gift rule it articulated in LaRue to remove jointly held property from the marital pool of assets:
[w]here one spouse transfers, delivers, or conveys his or her separately-owned property to
the other spouse, the transaction gives rise to a presumption that the transfer was intended
as a gift... [This presumption] may be rebutted ... by evidence of a contrary intent or
by evidence that the spouse whose property was transferred was ignorant or unaware of
the transaction.
Id.
The McComas court, for some reason, chose not to apply its holding in Hamstead that the
presumption of gift in interspousal transfers of property has no effect in excluding this property from
the marital pool. See Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d at 219.
43. Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1987).
44. Id. at 797.
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Significantly, Mrs. Roig also brought the court's attention to
section 48-3-10 of the West Virginia Code, which provides:
Where one spouse purchases real or personal property and pays for the same,
but takes title in the name of the other spouse, such transaction shall, in the
absence of evidence of a contrary intention, be presumed to be a gift by the
spouse so purchasing to the spouse in whose name the title is taken: Provided,
that in the case of an action under the provisions of article two [§ 48-2-1 et seq.]
of this chapter wherein the court is required to determine what property of the
parties constitutes marital property and equitably divide the same, the presumption
created by this section shall not apply, and a gift between spouses must be af45

firmatively proved.

Faced with the plain meaning of section 48-3-10, the Roig court
admitted its error in deciding Hamstead, stating that its Hamstead

decision was predicated on a reading of section 48-2-1(0(4) alone,
and that standing alone, the word "gift" is used in conjunction with
other words that relate only to transfers from persons outside the
marital partnership - that is, "... . gift, bequest, devise, descent,
or distribution. '" However, with its attention now directed to section 48-3-10,47 the court concluded that the legislature obviously intended to allow one spouse to transfer property to the other spouse
by irrevocable gift, thereby removing the assets so transferred from
inclusion in the marital pool of assets subject to equitable distri-

bution and bringing the gift within the section 48-2-1 (f)(4) exception
to marital property."
To exclude interspousal gifts from the marital property pool under the Roig decision, the spouse who would claim the gift must

now affirmatively prove that the property was intended as an ir-

45. W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1986) (emphasis added).
46. See 48-2-1(0(4) (1986).
47. Note that only 7 days prior to its Hamstead decision (March 11, 1987; Hamstead was decided
on March 18, 1987), the 'West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided Wachter v. Wachter, 357
S.E.2d 38, 41 (W. Va. 1987), in which the appellant claimed that she did not intend for a gift of
money to be made to her husband for the purchase of certain real property. The court, unbelievably,
refers to W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1986), yet only so far as it is identical to W. VA. CODE § 48-310 (1931). The court omits by ellipsis the added proviso which provides that gifts between spouses
must be affirmatively proved. See Wachter, 357 S.E.2d at 41 n.3.
48. Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d 794, 798 (XV. Va. 1987).
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revocable gift.4 9 The court noted that in this regard, there are certain
types of property (for example, jewelry and fur coats) that can b e
proven to be irrevocable gifts by mere circumstantial evidence; however, when real property, stocks, bonds, or other stores of family
wealth are claimed as "gift," much more than the simple fact that
property was transferred from one spouse to the other will be required to establish a qualified gift under section 48-2-1(f)(4).10
Thus, the effect of the court's Roig holding is the abrogation
of both its LaRue and Hamstead holdings: there is no presumption
of gift in interspousal transfers of property. However, if an interspousal gift is affirmatively proven, then it will be excluded from
the marital pool of assets subject to equitable distribution upon divorce."'
III. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF GIFTS TO THE MARITAL ESTATE
A. Whiting v. Whiting: A Statutory Preferencefor Marital
Property
Prior to the enactment of West Virginia's equitable distribution
statute, there was a presumption that where property was jointly
titled, the purchaser intended one-half of the money paid and the
one-half interest conveyed by joint titling to be a gift to the other
49. See id.; see also Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905 (W. Va. 1990) (the court
concluded that property transferred to husband from wife was not intended as a gift, but rather as
a distribution of marital assets in contemplation of divorce, and was thus held to be marital property
subject to equitable distribution); Vance v. Vance, 375 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va. 1988), overruled on other
grounds, Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d 413, 418 (W. Va. 1990) (since the husband did not meet
the burden of proof of establishing a gift from his wife of her interest in the couple's ambulance
business, the business was held to be marital property for purposes of equitable distribution).
50. Roig, 364 S.E.2d at 798.
51. Interestingly, Justice Neely anticipated the Roig holding in his concurring opinion in LaRue,
where he counselled that the presumption of gift should be eliminated, or at least qualified, as it
applies to interspousal gifts of a nonpersonal nature, while in no-way weakening the continued vitality
of the presumption of gift when the interspousal transactions are challenged by "disgruntled children,
greedy relatives, or creditors." LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312, 336 (W. Va. 1983) (Neely, J.,
concurring). Yet Justice Neely was not the sole prescient member of the court. In Fischer v. Fischer,
338 S.E.2d 233, 235 (W. Va. 1985), the majority of the court held that although certain cattle were
purchased by Mrs. Fischer and raised by Mr. Fischer, proceeds from the sale of the cattle could not
be awarded solely to Mr. Fischer absent compelling evidence of a gift. Although the record is unclear
as to whether Mr. Fischer claimed the cattle to be a gift to him, it is interesting to note that the
court, as in Roig, requires evidence of a gift to be presented on this issue. See Roig, 364 S.E.2d at
798.
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spouse. 52 In the 1990 case of Whiting v. Whiting, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals announced its decision regarding how
such property should be characterized under West Virginia's equi53
table distribution statutes.
At issue in Whiting is whether Mr. Whiting's act of having the
title to property owned by him prior to marriage placed in the name
of Mrs. Whiting as joint tenant after their marriage had the effect
of converting his separate interest into marital property. 54 In its discussion of the case, the Whiting court noted that section 48-2-1(e)(1),
in defining all property and earnings acquired during a marriage as
marital property (except for certain limited categories of property
which are considered as separate), sets forth an express statutory
preference for marital property. 55 Thus, given this preference, any
transfer of property owned by one spouse into joint title subsequent
to marriage is to be considered as a presumptive gift to the marital
estate, since the character of the ownership interest in the property
will have been fundamentally altered by the transfer of title. 6 The
jointly titled property must now be considered as "marital" and
subject to equitable distribution under the Whiting court's interpretation of the statute.
However, the court went on the make clear, the presumption of
a gift to the marital estate may be overcome by a showing that the
52. W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1931); see supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Dodd
v. Hinton, 312 S.E.2d 293, 295 (W. Va. 1984).
53. Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d 413 (W. Va. 1990). Note that the court in Whiting also

set forth a three-step process for the distribution of property under § 48-2-32. Id. at 416. The first
step is to differentiate between the parties' marital and separate property. Id. The second step is to

place a value on the marital property. Id. at 417. Under § 48-2-32(d)(1), the measure of value is the
net value of the marital property, ordinarily as of the date of the commencement of the divorce
action. See also Tankersley v. Tankersley, 390 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1990). The final step is the division
of the marital property between the parties. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 417. Under § 48-2-32(a), there
is a presumption of equal division of the marital estate. Under section 48-2-32(c)-(d)(2), provisions
are made for any unequal division. See also Romine v. Romine, 375 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1988);
Somerville v. Somerville, 369 S.E.2d 459 (V. Va. 1988).
54. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 419.

55. Id.at 421.
56. See id. at 419, 421. The court noted that any interest Mr. Whiting acquired in the property
as a result of the purchase two days after his marriage to the appellant would fall within the § 482-1(e) definition of marital property. Id. at 419. However, the one-half interest in the property he
claims to have acquired upon the death of his first wife could be considered separate property at the
time of his marriage, within the meaning of § 48-2-1(f)(1). Id.
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transferring spouse did not intend to transfer the property to joint
ownership or was induced to do so by fraud, coercion, duress, or
deception, with the burden of proof resting with the spouse who
57
would claim that there was no gift intended.
The Whiting court's reasoning in reaching its decision is sound.
Invoking its decision in Roig, the court noted that it is reasonable
to conclude that the legislative rejection of the presumption of interspousal gifts under section 48-3-10 was intended to prevent the
automatic creation of separate property interests during marriage
58
merely by reference to the manner in which the property was titled.
Thus, the holding in Whiting fills the gap left by the Roig decision,
since otherwise, absent affirmative proof of an unequivocal gift of
separate property under Roig, any jointly held property would be
held to be the separate property of only one spouse, despite documentary proof of co-ownership and a statutory preference for marital property. 9
B.

The Theory of Transmutation by Joint Titling

Although the court's holding in Whiting is consistent with both
the act of making a joint title and the concept of marriage as a
partnership or shared enterprise, it nonetheless abrogates the express
statutory language which defines property "acquired by a person
before marriage" as separate property. 60 Instead, the court chose to
adopt a more equitable approach to property distribution based on
the theory of transmutation in which the initial statutory classification of the property as "separate" may be frustrated by a party's
actions which demonstrate an intent to "transmute" the entire prop61
erty to "marital" by titling the property jointly.
For example, as in the facts involved in the Whiting case, a
spouse may acquire property before marriage, bringing the property
within the statutory definition of "separate property" under section
57. Id. at 421.
58. Id.

59. See id.
60. See id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(f)(1) (1986).
61. Joan M. Krauskopf, Classifying Marital and Separate Property Combinations and Increase
in Value of Separate Property, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 997, 1002 (1987).
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48-2-1(0(1). When he or she subsequently marries and transfers the
title to the property so that his or her spouse becomes joint owner,
then under the Whiting decision the property is presumed to be a
gift to the marital estate, and the initial statutory classification of
the property as "separate" is frustrated by the party's intent to
"transmute" the entire property to "marital" classification by titling
the property jointly. 62
However, in West Virginia, a single piece of property can have
a dual character - part separate and part marital. 63 The joint titling
of separate property gives rise only to a rebuttable presumption of
a gift to the marital estate under the Whiting decision, and if this
presumption is rebutted, then the property will retain its characterization as "separate" and will be considered as "marital" only
to the extent that marital funds or efforts were devoted to it.6
This result is consistent with section 48-2-1(e)(2), which provides
for a marital property component to separate property to the extent
that the value of the separate property is increased by the expenditure of marital resources. 65 Thus, in this specific instance, both
the statute and the Whiting decision permit a tracing of the parties'
respective contributions in order to determine the marital and nonmarital components of the property for purposes of equitable distribution.
Such a tracing of the parties' contributions is known as the source
of funds rule. 66 However, the Whiting court makes clear the source

62. See id. at 1002-03; see also Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 413, 421 (W. Va. 1990).
63. Krauskopf, supra note 61, at 1002; see also Shank v. Shank, 387 S.E.2d 325, 327 (W. Va.

1989) (in which the court held that West Virginia is a "dual property" jurisdiction in which property
can be characterized as part separate and part marital).
64. See Krauskopf, supra note 61, at 1002; see also Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 421.
65. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(2) (1986) provides, in pertinent part: "Marital property" means:
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties
to a marriage, which increase results from (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital
property, including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness against separate
property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property, or
(B) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.
See also Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 421.
66. Krauskopf, supra note 57, at 1000 ("source of funds" rule is defined as one which classifies
a particular piece of property depending upon the source of funds or effort which created its value).
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of funds rule is ordinarily not available to characterize as "separate"
property that property which has been transferred to joint title during the marriage, since tracing the sources of funds is incompatible

with the partnership concept of marriage. 67
C. Judicial Critique of Whiting v. Whiting
Justice Neely dissents quite strongly to the majority opinion in
Whiting. While noting that most spouses use, title, and transfer

property for the benefit of the marriage premised on their belief
that the marriage will continue, he contends that these same spouses
do not, however, intend to unjustly enrich their partners in the event
that the marriage fails: "most people jointly title separate property
...

conditioned on the couple's remaining married.

68

By creating

a presumption in favor of marital property at the time of divorce
based on mere title, spouses who, by keeping property in only their
names, refuse to allow the marital unit to use their separate property
will be rewarded, while spouses who allow the marital unit to use
their separate property will be punished. 69

67. Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d 413, 423 (W. Va. 1990) ("The law of tracing actually
discourages sharing and rewards spouses who keep a running account of what is theirs.") (quoting
L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 5.29 (1989)).

Note, however, that there are times in which such tracing of funds may be appropriate. Id.
Along with the instances in which the presumption of gift to the marital estate can be rebutted, id.
at 421, the origins of property may be traced in order to establish that the property is indeed to be
considered separate under one of the means listed in § 48-2-1(f), see id. at 423, or to aid the trial
court in determining an "equitable" division of marital property when the presumption of an equal
division should not apply. Id.; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(a)-(c) (1986); Romine v. Romine,
375 S.E.2d 432 (,V. Va. 1988); Somerville v. Somerville, 369 S.E.2d 459 (W.Va. 1988).
The court has recently, however, created another narrow - but significant - exception to its
eschewal of the source of funds rule in Whiting. In Charlton v. Charlton, No. 19763, 1991 WL
258812, at *6 (,V. Va. Dec. 6, 1991), the court held that where a spouse inherits property and entrusts
the investment of that property to the other spouse who is more financially knowledgeable, and the
property itself is not used for marital purposes, the fact that the property is titled in the joint names
of the spouses will not convert it to marital property. The source of funds rule, therefore, may be
applied to keep such property from being included in the distributable pool of assets in this limited
circumstance.
The court bases its opinion on the "critical factor" that Mr. Charlton had a fiduciary responsibility to his wife, who was "ignorant in this area" and entrusted her inheritance to her husband,
who then placed Mrs. Charlton's inheritance in joint accounts. This, however, appears to be a weak
basis upon which to create an exception to the court's well-reasoned Whiting decision. See Justice
Neely's dissenting opinion, id. at *8, *10, for a biting critique of the Charlton decision.
68. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 426-27 (Neely, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 427.
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While the former Chief Justice's contentions may be sociologically sound, they are not well-grounded in law. Indeed, he appears
to be overstating his case vis-ez-vis express statutory language which
includes in the definition of "marital property":
(2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either
of the parties to a marriage, which increase results from (A) an expenditure of
funds which are marital property, including an expenditure of such funds which
reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise
increases the net value of separate property, or (B) work performed by either or
both of the parties during the marriage.70

Under the statute's broad view of marital property, any attempt
to find marital "use" of separate property should be predicated on
a standard of "use" that would encompass much more than a showing of affirmative utilization of the property by the parties. 71 Thus,
it appears that even those spouses who keep the property titled in
their own names run the risk of having that property fall within the
statute's definition of marital property unless they vigilantly ahd
vigorously endeavor to keep this separate property separate, since
the mere act of keeping property titled separately will not per se
prove that the marital unit has not "used" the property. In fact,
the court is likely to find, given its reasoning in Whiting, that the
property has been transmuted into marital property through the
combined, permissive acts of both parties in relation to the prop72
erty.
Justice Neely further points to the statutory language defining
marital property as "[a]ll property and earnings acquired during
[the] marriage, ' 73 and separate property as "[p]roperty acquired...
before marriage, " 74 concluding that the legislature intended that the
classification of property depend upon how and when the property
is "acquired" and not how it is titled. 75 However, the Whiting ma-

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(2) (1986).
See id.; see also Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 421.
See Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d 413, 421 (W. Va. 1990).
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (1986) (emphasis added).
Id. § 48-2-1(f)(1) (emphasis added).
Whiting, 396 S.E.2d at 429.
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jority obviously chose to interpret these provisions quite liberally in
this regard, in keeping with the equitable considerations underlying
76
them.
Finally, Justice Neely invokes the language of section 48-3-10,
which provides that "gift[s] between spouses must be affirmatively
proved. ' 77 Here, the language clearly indicates that the gifts contemplated in the meaning of the statute must be gifts between spouses.
The ordinary meaning of the words implies that the gifts be inter
vivos transfers of property from one spouse to the other and not
gifts to the marital estate intended for the benefit of both spouses.
Further evidence that the above reading is the intended reading comes
earlier in the statutory section: "[w]here one spouse purchases ...
property and pays for the same, but takes title in the name of the
78
other spouse ....
Clearly, the legislature did not intend for this
provision to apply to separate property subsequently transferred to
joint title - the situation precisely at issue in Whiting.
IV.

EQurriABLE DISTRUTION OF PROPERTY AFTER WmnNG V.

A.

Hamstead v. Hamstead: Broadening the Scope of Marital
Property
The Whiting decision has been tested a number of times in its
short life, and the court has stood steadfastly behind its principle
of broadening the scope of marital property. 9 In fact, in Hamstead
v. Hamstead, the court significantly expands the circumstances under
which separate property can be transmuted into marital property.80
76. See id. at 421.
77. W. VA. CODE § 48-3-10 (1986).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. See Holstein v. Holstein, No. 19835, 1991 WL 269838 (W. Va. Dec. 19, 1991); McGraw
v. McGraw, No. 19758, 1991 WL 221958 (W. Va. Nov. 1, 1991); Kimble v. Kimble, No. 20059, 1991
WL 221997 (N. Va. Nov. 1, 1991); Wood v. Wood, 403 S.E.2d 761 (N. Va. 1991); Hamstead v.
Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d 280 (N. Va. 1990); Tallman v. Tallman, 396 S.E.2d 453 (N. Va. 1990); Koontz
v. Koontz, 396 S.E.2d 439 (N. Va. 1990). Note that Charlton v. Charlton, No. 19763, 1991 WL
258812 (N. Va. Dec. 6, 1991), although decided on the Whiting precedent, nonetheless creates an
anomalous exception to Whiting. See supra note 67 for a more thorough discussion of the Charlton
holding.
80. Hamstead v. Harastead, 400 S.E.2d 280 (N. Va. 1990). Note that this case arises out of
the same divorce proceeding as Hamstead v. Hamstead, 357 S.E.2d 216 (N. Va.), overruled on other
grounds, Roig v. Roig, 364 S.E.2d 794 (W. Va. 1987).
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The facts involved in the Hamstead case are rather dense. The
Hamsteads were married in 1975, at which time the value of Mr.
Hamstead's law partnership totalled $1,346.10.81 In 1980, Mr. Hamstead established a legal corporation, Hanstead & Hamstead, L.C.,
and issued $5,000 worth of capital stock to himself in exchange for
setting up the corporation. 82 Mr. Hamstead later received an inheritance upon the death of his father, which included corporate
stocks worth $268,000, which he subsequently transferred to the corporation in exchange for a promissory note for $270,000.83 At the
time Mrs. Hamstead filed for divorce in 1984, the corporation's net
worth totalled $423,898.41.8
The trial court ruled that both the law firm and the shares of
stock that had been transferred to the firm were the sole separate
property of Mr. Hamstead, and thus were not subject to equitable
distribution. 5 Mrs. Hamstead appealed this ruling, arguing that since
nearly the entire net worth of the corporation had been accumulated
during her marriage to Mr. Hamstead, the corporate assets should
be distributed under the statute defining "[a]ll property and earnings
6
acquired by either spouse during marriage" as marital property.1
The Hamstead court, agreeing with Mrs. Hamstead, found the
value of the corporation to fall within the statutory definition of
"marital property" since not only was the capital stock issued to
Mr. Hamstead in 1980 in exchange for professional services rendered
during the marriage, but "almost" the entire net worth of the corporation was derived "in substantial part" from the retention of
Mr. Hamstead's earnings by the corporation to which he contributed
87
legal services throughout the marriage.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; W. VA. CODE § 48-2-1(e)(1) (1986). The trial court's classification of Mr. Hamstead's

pension fund as separate property was also on appeal in this case. The Hamstead court found the
pension plan to be marital property subject to equitable distribution. Hamstead v. Hamstead, 400
S.E.2d 280, 284-85 (W. Va. 1990); see also Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (%V.Va. 1987); Raley v.
Raley, 338 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1985).
87. Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d at 284. Note that the court had been faced with classifying as marital
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What is interesting about this holding is that the court apparently
discounted as inconsequential the value of the law practice (approximately $1,350) which existed at the time of the Hamsteads'
marriage. 88 It appears that the concern with protecting the marital
partnership is so strong here that the court will allow the separate
property that Mr. Hamstead brought to the marriage to be obverted
in order to classify the entire net worth of the corporation as marital
89
property.
It seems, then, that the original value of the separate property
will not be allowed to take precedence over any substantive increase
in the value of marital property when it is clear that subsequent
marital efforts were devoted exclusively to the enterprise that produced that value. 9° However, the court may have had difficulty
reaching this same conclusion if the value of Mr. Hamstead's law
practice prior to his marriage had been more substantial.91
B.

The Theory of Transmutation by Commingling

The greater significance of the Hamstead decision is the court's
rejection of Mr. Hamstead's contention that since a substantial portion of the value of Hamstead & Hamstead, L.C. was attributable
to the stocks he inherited from his father - "separate property"
under the statute - which were later deposited in the corporation

property earnings retained in the separate property of a spouse in Shank v. Shank, 387 S.E.2d 325
(W. Va. 1989). The facts in Shank can be distinguished from those in Hamstead, however, because
in Hamstead, Mrs. Hamstead claims that the entity in which the earnings were retained was marital,
not separate, property. See Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d at 282. Furthermore, in Shank, the court found
that any increase in the value of Mr. Shank's property was due to the passive appreciation of the
property rather than any marital efforts, and thus should be considered separate property under §
48-2-1(0(6). See Shank, 387 S.E.2d at 328; see also Rogers v. Rogers, 405 S.E.2d 235 (W. Va. 1991).
88. See Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d at 282.
89. See Krauskopf, supra note 61, at 1027.
90. Id.
91. Note that in Kimble v. Kimble, No. 20059, 1991 WL 221997, at *4 (W. Va. Nov. 1, 1991),
the court did not allow the $100,000 original value of the funeral business owned by Mr. Kimble
prior to marriage to be distributed as marital property even though $40,000 of marital funds had
been used to improve the property: "[o]bviously, the pre-marriage value of the assets remains the
separate property of Mr. Kimble and such amount is not subject to equitable distribution." Id. at
*4. The $6,000 net increase in the value of the business was held to be a marital asset; also, Mrs.
Kimble was reimbursed for the amount of separate funds that she contributed to "Mr. Kimble's
business." Id. at *3. The court made no reference to its Hamstead holding in the Kimble case in
this regard.
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in exchange for a $270,000 note payable to Mr. Hamstead, the corporation should be considered as separate property, not subject to
equitable distribution.92
Although this exchange appears to fall within the statutory provision defining "[p]roperty acquired by a person during marriage
in exchange for separate property" as separate property, 93 the court
did not agree. Instead, the court found that the substitution of the
$270,000 note for the stocks "essentially altered" the character of
the stocks as separate property, thereby taking Mr. Hamstead's exchange of the property out of the purview of the statute:
What, in effect, the corporation did was to use its credit to purchase the stocks
from [Mr. Hamstead], and the purchase price was paid in the form of the note
which was payable to him separately. The unpaid balance of the note remains a
charge against the corporation's assets ....

Rather clearly [the stocks] were pur-

chased by the corporation for $270,000 and were not a simple contribution by
[Mr. Hamstead].94

Such an alteration of the nature of the stocks, brought about
by their deposit in the corporation in exchange for the note, results
in their now being characterized as marital property. 95 This method
of transmutation of separate property into marital property is known
as "commingling," in which the act of placing separate property
into the marital pool of assets results in the transformation of the
separate property into marital property." The court's decision on
this point clearly indicates that a spouse will not be permitted merely
to pass separate property through a corporation which is part of
the marital estate in exchange for another form of separate property
without the marital estate being benefitted from the exchange by
the consequent transmutation of the separate property into marital
property.9

92. Hamstead v. Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d 280, 284

(,V. Va. 1990); W.

VA. CODE

§ 48-2-1(f)(4)

(1986).

93. W. VA.

CODE § 48-2-1(f)(2) (1986).
94. Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d at 284.

95. See id.
96. Krauskopf, supra note 61, at 1006.
97. See id. at 1007 ("Combining separate and marital funds to acquire investments, such as
...shares of stock, often results in classifying the entire amount as marital.").
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Yet while the court did not explicitly acknowledge the theory
that the commingling of separate and marital assets will transmute
the separate property into a gift to the marital estate, the court did
suggest, through negative implication, that this was its intention. In
holding that the note acquired by Mr. Hamstead after the marriage
in exchange for the stocks should be considered separate property,
the court stated that when an individual during marriage has property which is separate property and then exchanges that property
for other property which is titled in his name alone, and which is
not commingled with maritalproperty, then that other property acquired as a result of the exchange is itself separate property under
98
the statute.
Thus, under Hamstead, transmutation does not occur when separate property is merely exchanged for other property, and the contribution of only separate property can be identified in the acquisition
of the "new" property. However, transmutation of separate property into marital property will occur when marital and separate funds
are commingled in the process of acquiring the "new" property,
since it can be inferred that the separate property owner is considering the welfare of the marital unit by commingling the funds,
thereby giving rise to the presumption of a gift to the marital estate,
as under Whiting.99
V.

CRITIQUE OF THE WHITING AND HAMSTEAD DECISIONS

The implication under the Hamstead court's holding that the
mere commingling of funds will transmute separate property into
marital property creates a potential danger to separate property owners, since it appears that neither titling nor record-keeping will provide the necessary indicia of intent not to transmute - transmutation
appears to occur automatically once the properties are commingled. 0 Considered from this perspective, the Hamstead decision may
98. Hamstead v. Hamstead, 400 S.E.2d 280, 284 (W. Va. 1990); see also Holstein v. Holstein,
No. 19835, 1991 WL 269838, *2 n.2 (%V.Va. Dec. 19, 1991) (the court, in holding that separate
funds placed in a joint bank account are presumed to be marital property, noted: "It is apparent
that the [separate] funds became commingled to some extent with other marital funds.").
99. Krauskopf, supra note 61, at 1006.
100. Id. at 1007-08.
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have the effect that former Chief Justice Neely warned of in his
dissent in Whiting: those spouses who refuse to allow the marital
unit the use of their separate property will be rewarded, and the
interspousal sharing of property will be discouraged. 1 1 This result
would obviously subvert two of the principle tenets of equitable
distribution: the policy of treating marriage as a "business partnership," and the goal of encouraging the prosperity of the marital
estate.
Yet, given the realities of marriage, these fears appear to be
overstated. Most married persons simply do not contemplate divorce
throughout the course of their marriage, and it is most likely that
spouses will continue to share their property and earnings during
marriage quite freely and to the benefit of the marital estate, in
spite of the dangers that the Whiting and Hamstead decisions present
to spouses who own separate property.
Such continued sharing of resources is at the center of the public
policy which encourages marital prosperity; however, when a marriage has fallen into disharmony and divorce ensues, these recent
decisions will ensure that each spouse receives his or her equitable
share of the marital assets under the state's current equitable distribution laws.
VI.

Tm INEQUITIES OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION

Still, the Whiting and Hamsteaddecisions can provide only shortterm solutions to the much larger gender-based problem of the very
real inequities that exist in men's and women's financial positions
following divorce.t02 While the expansion of rights for women through
an equitable allocation of marital property appears to be a sound
public policy decision, concern for the inherent imbalances in the
economic and social status of men and women has been subordi-

101. See Whiting v. Whiting, 396 S.E.2d 413, 427 (Neely, C.J., dissenting).
102. Note Justice Neely's acknowledgement of the long-term inequities of attempts at short-term
wealth redistribution: "[t]houghtless wealth redistribution didn't work in Uganda, Zaire and Mozambique, and it won't work in domestic relations. In the short-term those who are poor receive an
infusion of money. In the longf-]term, however, the wealth producers find ways to protect their wealth
from transfer or they quit producing wealth." Charlton v. Charlton, No. 19763, 1991 WL 258812,
at *9 (W. Va. Dec. 6, 1991).
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nated to the desired end of "self-sufficiency" for both parties after
divorce. 03 Consequently, many needs of the economically-weaker
spouse remain unfulfilled even after the equitable distribution of
marital property.
Specifically, the kind of property subject to equitable distribution
is often insufficient to provide long-term economic maintenance.
Traditional family assets of real and personal property are generally
of lesser cumulative value than benefits derived from work, and the
mere equitable distribution of these tangible assets upon divorce cannot take the place of lost income, fringe benefits, and pension
rights.101 In fact, in one year, the average divorcing couple can earn
more money than the value of their total assets, and, if these assets
are distributed under a statute with a presumptive fifty/fifty apportionment, then the couple's combined earning capacity has become at least twice as valuable as the half-shares of the equitably
distributed assets.' 0 5 It is not difficult to conclude, then, that access
to future income is a property right and one which should be recognized by the courts when fashioning equitable remedies to property division.
Yet the manner in which courts tend to distribute property under
the statutes demonstrates that ensuring access to future income for
both spouses is rarely a factor taken into account when making such
decisions. In equitable distribution awards, the wife is more likely
to be allowed to retain the marital home and furnishings, while the
husband is granted the business, financial assets, and other real estate. 10 Consequently, the wife who does not work outside of the
home receives only a lump-sum property settlement, while the husband's business or earning capacity continues to produce income
year after year, and thus the property retained by the husband after
the divorce is of a greater cumulative value than the wife's share.13 7
103. Cf. David T. Rothman, The State as Parent: Social Policy in the Progressive Era, in DoiNo
GooD: THE LiMrrs OF BENEVOLENCE 69 (1978) (discussing the unintended problems government solutions to social problems may cause); see also Reynolds, supra note 1, at 837.
104. MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAI.Y AND THE NEW PROPERTY 91 (1981).
105. LENORE J. WE'rzmAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 60 (1985).

106. Id.at 77.
107. Id. at 60.
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Even the wife who works outside the home is not shielded from
the effects of this substantive inequality. Women continue to have
only limited access to meaningful labor force participation.108 Work
available to women is generally of a more marginal character than
that available to men - that is, the jobs to which women have the
most access are those with low status and compensation, with few
or no fringe benefits, pension rights, seniority, or opportunity for
promotion. 109 As one forward-thinking judge has noted:
We cannot proceed in a divorce case on the assumption of "legal equality of
employment" beyond the extent to which it appears that such an assumption is
justified in the particular case, that is, the individual woman in the case at bar

has attained access or can obtain access to the job market to be self-supporting .... Just as it is unacceptable for the law to force all women into the mold
of homemaker, it is similarly unacceptable to treat all women upon divorce as
per se self-sufficient breadwinners in an open, full-employment job market."10

The majority of courts, however, remains disinclined to confront
the economic realities which exist in the marketplace for women. " '
Furthermore, men, especially those in the throes of a divorce, are
as a class reluctant to acknowledge that they have benefited specifically from their wives' employment choices and generally from
market discrimination against women, and thus they remain unwilling to acknowledge their wives' continued financial dependency
upon them post divorce.1 2 Indeed, even the proponents of equitable
distribution are loathe to admit to the continuing responsibility on
the part of the husband to their ex-wives, since the continued "need"
or "dependency" of women carries with it negative symbolic connotations about the status of women which oppose the preferred
view of women as equal partners within marriage and independent,
equal economic actors outside of it.113
108., GLENDoN, supra note 104, at 193.
109. Id. at 195.
110. Johnson v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 198, 209 (,Vis. 1977) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
111. Note, however, Justice Neely's dissenting opinion in Charlton v. Charlton, No. 19763, 1991
WL 258812, at *8 (W. Va. Dec. 6, 1991): "[i]f the majority had said today that because they believe
women are so disadvantaged in our society ... [that] they will torture our law to temper the wind
for the shorn lady lambs, they would at least have stood squarely on the rock of history and I would
not be invited to ridicule."
112. Fineman, supra note 7, at 289 n.16.
113. Id. at 291.
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Yet, equality cannot be mandated by ideological fiat, and however distasteful an acknowledgement of "need" may be to courts,
men, and advocates of gender equality, to proceed on the assumption that "equality" now exists is to detrimentally ignore the material reality of many divorcing women.1 14 In truth, the circumstances
of most divorcing women fall somewhere in between the antithetical
positions of equality and need. 1 5 Therefore, a preferable approach
to property distribution is the creation of a broad range of acceptable outcomes which would accommodate a variety of differences among divorcing women in various circumstances.
VII. TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
The burden of the implementation and success of any alternative
distribution scheme must be borne either by the economically-stronger
spouse or by society at large. If the responsibility of ensuring equality of economic circumstances between divorcing men and women
is assumed by society, one possible approach would be to provide
economic credit for job training, education, and child care either
116
through direct grants in aid or a negative income tax structure.
Furthermore, when the marital pool of assets is too small for the
divorcing couple to maintain separate households, rent subsidies or
other direct economic assistance would help to provide relief.
Another, rather sweeping approach would be for courts to shift
their focus from considering property as a mere tangible asset to
considering it as a flexible legal construct - one which would encompass a recognition of a spouse's substantial economic interest
in any future benefits which arise from economic activities engaged
in by either party during marriage. This approach is derived from
the doctrine of factual expectancy long-recognized in insurance law,
under which a party with no enforceable legal or equitable interest
in real property may nonetheless insure the property against loss
provided that the party has a lawful and substantial economic in117
terest in the preservation of the property.
114. Id. at 287, 291.
115. See id. at 291 n.23.
116. GLENDON, supra note 104, at 135.
117. Nat'l Filtering Oil Co. v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 13 N.E. 337 (N.Y. 1887); see generally ROBERT
E. KEETON & ALAN A. WmDss, INSURANCE LAW 3.4(5) (1988).
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If a similar approach to the definition of distributable property
in domestic relations law were adopted, courts would then have a
legal basis upon which to acknowledge a wife's interest in her husband's future income. Also, by allowing a wife to realize a return
on her long-term investment in the marriage, further credence would
be given to the partnership or shared enterprise concept of marriage
upon which the doctrine of equitable distribution is based.
However, such drastic shifts in public policy and jurisprudential
doctrine are in large part unnecessary. In the majority of states with
equitable distribution statutes, mechanisms for allocating property
in a manner to address need are already in place.11 8 Indeed, the
primary legislative reason to opt for equitable, rather than equal,
division is to reserve discretion for the court to divide the property
unequally in the face of meritorious facts.119
Under West Virginia's equitable distribution statute, for example,
although there is a presumption that marital property is to be divided
equally between the parties, discretion is left to the court to alter
this distribution after a consideration of certain discretionary factors, such as the extent to which a party has contributed to the
marital pool of assets by monetary or nonmonetary contributions. 20
More significantly, however, the court may also consider:
mhe extent to which [a] party expended his or her efforts during the marriage
in a manner which limited or decreased such party's income-earning ability or
increased the income-earning ability of the other party, including, but not limited
to:
(A) Direct or indirect contributions by either party to the education or training
of the other party which has increased in income-earning ability of such other
party; and
(B) Foregoing by either party of employment or other income-earning activity
through an understanding of the parties or at the insistence of the other party.'2'

118. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 841 & n.70.
119. Id. at 849; see, e.g., W. VA. CoDE § 48-2-32(d)(2) (1986):
the court may... equitably adjust the definition of the parties' interest in marital property,
increasing the interest in marital property of a party adversely affected ... who should
otherwise be awarded less than one half of the marital property, to an interest not to exceed
one half of the marital property.
120. W. VA. CODE § 48-2-32(c)(1)-(2) (1986).
121. Id. § 48-2-32(c)(3).
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Thus, the West Virginia equitable distribution statute does, at least
implicitly, address need by permitting the consideration of certain
"need" factors to arrive at equitable solutions to the various present
and future circumstances of the parties.
However, courts to whom such discretion is given, including the
West Virginia trial and appellate courts, rarely deviate from the
presumptive fifty/fifty division of property, and in cases where the
division is unequal, the deviation is slight - usually a sixty/forty
ratio - and merely symbolic. 1 2 Distribution of property in significantly unequal proportions seems to occur only when the disparity
of the parties' circumstances is truly extraordinary.12 Thus, although
most equitable distribution statutes do recognize post-divorce need
as a lawful basis for an unequal distribution of marital assets, the
fact that such distribution is merely discretionary leads to a de facto
policy which implies that the continued dependency of the economically weaker spouse need not be a significant concern of the court.124

122. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 855, 861-62.
123. See, e.g., Bradley v. Bradley, 336 S.E.2d 658 (N.C. 1985) (in which the court approved
an unequal division benefiting a wife with multiple sclerosis).
124. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 903. Note that the West Virginia court has upheld discretionary
awards of "rehabilitative alimony" under § 48-2-15 to -16. See Molnar v. Molnar, 314 S.E.2d 73
(WV.Va. 1984). Such an alimony award is generally granted for a limited time where a younger
dependent spouse entered the marriage with marketable skills which then deteriorated through nonuse,
or where a dependent spouse is obviously capable of self-support but requires some training or academic study before complete financial independence can be achieved. Id. at 76. In granting rehabilitative alimony, the trial court must consider: (1) whether such alimony should be granted in view
of the length of the marriage and the age, health, and skills of the dependent spouse; (2) the amount
and duration of the alimony award must be determined if feasible; and (3) consideration should be
given to continuing jurisdiction to reconsider the amount and duration of the alimony award. Id. at
78.
Since the Molnar court upheld the awarding of rehabilitative alimony in 1984, the court has
heard only 19 appellate cases in which rehabilitative alimony has been considered. See McGraw v.
McGraw, No. 19758, 1991 WL 211958 (W. Va. Nov. 1, 1991); Rogers v. Rogers, 405 S.E.2d 235
(W. Va. 1991); Wood v. Wood, 403 S.E.2d 761 (W. Va. 1991); Wyant v. Wyant, 400 S.E.2d 869
(WV.Va. 1990); Louk v. Louk, 399 S.E.2d 875 (W. Va. 1990); Bettinger v. Bettinger, 396 S.E.2d 709
(W. Va. 1990); Nichols v. Nichols, 391 S.E.2d 623 (W. Va. 1990); Koppel v. Koppel, 388 S.E.2d
848 (W. Va. 1989); Pajak v. Pajak, 385 S.E.2d 384 (W. Va. 1989); Queen v. Queen, 375 S.E.2d 592
(W. Va. 1988); Romine v. Romine, 375 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1988); Vance v. Vance, 375 S.E.2d 427
(W. Va. 1988); Gorby v. Gorby, 375 S.E.2d 424 (W. Va. 1988); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W.
Va. 1988); Cross v. Cross, 363 S.E.2d 449 (V. Va. 1987); Greeson v. Greeson, 358 S.E.2d 448 (V.
Va. 1987); Butcher v. Butcher, 357 S.E.2d 226 (W. Va. 1987); Biafore v. Biafore, 350 S.E.2d 550
(WV.Va. 1987); Luff v. Luff, 329 S.E.2d 100 (W. Va. 1985). Given the number of divorces awarded
in the state each year, and the number of these awards appealed to the West Virginia Supreme Court
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However, there are several remedies available which, if adopted,
will begin, to redress the inequalities which continue to exist under
current equitable distribution laws. In states with equitable distribution statutes like West Virginia's in which the "need" factors to
be considered by the court are both discretionary and ambiguously
articulated, state legislatures should amend their statutes so that explicitly enumerated factors such as age, health, standard of living,
occupation, amount and sources of income, and vocational and educational training of the spouses are required to be considered in
any decision on the equitable distribution of property.'2 Also, states
should adopt maintenance statutes coexistent with their equitable
distribution statutes which would require the court to grant a maintenance order for either spouse if the spouse seeking maintenance
is found to lack sufficient property and income to provide for his
or her reasonable postdivorce needs. 126 Finally, state appellate courts
must set the standard of strict judicial enforcement of the plain
meaning and unambiguous language of their equitable distribution
laws, thus making clear that providing for the continuing needs of
divorced spouses is a significant public concern. 2 7
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of equitable distribution arose out of the recognition that women are equal partners in a marriage and must be
compensated as such upon divorce. Courts have generally made good
faith attempts to comply with equitable distribution laws and have,
in such cases as Whiting and Hamstead, deliberately broadened the
scope of equitable distribution in order to allow more property into
the distributable pool of assets.
Yet mere expansion of the definition of marital property does
not address the needs that exist after property has been distributed,
of Appeals, the fact that only 20 appellate cases have considered rehabilitative alimony in 8 years
gives rise to a strong inference that rehabilitative alimony is not seriously considered by courts in
fashioning "equitable" divorce awards.
125. Reynolds, supra note 1, at 842, 911-13.
126. See, e.g., MoNT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203(l)(a) (1987); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAwi § 236 Pt. B(6)
(McKinney 1986). See supra note 124 for a discussion of the West Virginia courts' history of awarding
rehabilitative or maintenance alimony on a purely discretionary basis.
127. See Reynolds, supra note 1, at 908.
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nor does it acknowledge the sacrifices that many women make which,
although beneficial to the marital partnership, are detrimental to
their own future interests. Consequently, equitable distribution statutes, as they now exist, either ignore or gloss over the continued
"dependency" or "need" of the economically-weaker spouse for
whom an equitable distribution of marital assets upon divorce is an
inadequate safeguard against future economic needs.
Remedies which are more truly "equitable" do exist, however.
Social programs specifically designed to address these spouses' needs
might be enacted; the prevailing concept of "property" could be
expanded to include intangible assets such as future income and
benefits, which could then be awarded as spousal maintenance in
addition to the distribution of tangible assets. Also, existing statutes
could be amended to require courts to consider explicitly-enumerated
"need" factors in making property award decisions, so that the
usual perfunctory fifty/fifty division of the property will give way
to more equitable distribution awards.
Although avenues of redress are waiting to be explored, the burden of gender-inequality continues to remain with those least able
to bear it. The equitable distribution of marital property as it now
exists must therefore be seen as only an intermediate goal in the
struggle for a substantive equality of status and opportunity for men
and women.
Lee vanEgmond
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